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By letter of 3 February 1992 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
requested authorization to draw up a report on the situation in Cambodia. 
At the sitting of 9 March 1992 the President of Parliament announced that the 
committee had been authorized to report on this subject. 
At its meeting of 17 March 1992, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
appointed Mr Cheysson rapporteur. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation was requested to deliver an opinion 
on 8 June 1992. 
At its meetings of 14 April 1992, 25 May 1992, 28 January 1993 and 26 February 
1993, the committee considered the draft report. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 24 votes to 1, 
with 1 abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: Cassanmagnago Cerretti, 1st vice-chairman 
and acting chairman; Sir Fred Catherwood, 2nd vice-chairman; Cheysson, 
rapporteur; Avgerinos, Canavarro, Coimbra Martins (for Dury), Crampton, De 
Matteo (for Lord Bethell), Dillen, Ferrer (for Bonetti), Gaibisso, Habsburg, 
Holzfuss, Jepsen, Langer, Llorca Vilaplana, Magnani Noya, McMillan-Scott, 
Newens, Oostlander (for Formigoni), Penders, Planas, Pons Grau (for Balfe), Prag 
(for Lacaze), van Putten (for Cravinho), Suarez Gonzalez (for Pirkl) and Titley. 
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached. 
The report was tabled on 1 March 1993. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the situation in cambodia 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to its resolution of 23 November 1989 on Cambodia1 , 
having regard to its resolution of 1 0 October 1990 on the situation in 
Cambodia2 , 
having regard to its resolution of 12 September 1991 on the situation in 
South-East Asia3, 
having regard to the report of the ad hoc delegation consisting of Claude 
Cheysson, Jean-Louis Bourlanges and Karel De Gucht, which undertook a fact-
finding mission to Cambodia on behalf of the European Parliament from 2 to 
4 9 December 1992 , 
having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A3-
0081/93), 
A. saluting with sorrow the memory of the victims of the appalling campaign of 
genocide carried out in Cambodia in the recent past, 
B. whereas the Paris agreements of 23 October 1991 provided a suitable basis 
for a comprehensive settlement accompanied by the necessary international 
guarantees, which would enable peace to be restored in Cambodia, thus 
bringing to an end 23 years of civil war, genocide and foreign occupation, 
C. whereas a year has already gone by since the agreements were signed and 
whereas, just a few months before the elections scheduled for May 1993, the 
failure by the military to abide by the peace agreements raises fears 
concerning the smooth running of the elections and the peace process as a 
whole, as noted in UN Security Council Resolution 792 of 27 November 1992, 
D. whereas the Khmer Rouge have refused to allow their troops, estimated to 
number some 100 000) to be disarmed, which has made it impossible for them 
to be demobilized and assigned to camps, although some 50 000 of the 
estimated 200 000 soldiers belonging to the other factions have grouped 
together in camps; and whereas the many other violations have prevented 
transition to Stage II of the peace plan which had been scheduled for 13 
June 1992 under the Paris agreements, 
E. whereas, through their failure to observe the Paris Agreements and their 
warlike actions, the Khmer Rouge have shown that they have not abandoned the 
OJ No. c 323, 27. 12. 1989, p. 1 01 
2 OJ No. c 284, 12. 11 . 1990, 59 p. 
3 OJ No. c 267, 14.10.1991, 159 p. 
4 PE 203.723 
DOC EN\RR\223\223073 
- 4 - PE 203.359/fin. 
-
idea of regaining power by brutal methods and thereby emphasized the real, 
abiding danger that the country would then be plunged back into horror, 
F. whereas the general climate of insecurity thus prevailing in Cambodia will 
prevent the May 1993 general elections from being held in desirable 
conditions of political neutrality, 
G. whereas the obstruction of the peace process mapped out by the Paris 
Agreements is forcing UNTAC to play a more direct, more controversial and 
therefore more exposed role than planned in restoring the minimum level of 
security and neutrality if democratic elections are to be held, 
H. whereas UNTAC has obtained excellent results in certain areas, as 
demonstrated by the fact that more than 4 million people out of an estimated 
total of 4.5 million electors have put their names on the electoral rolls 
and 320 000 people out of an estimated total of 350 000 refugees have been 
repatriated, 
I. whereas the Security Council decided on 27 November 1992 to go ahead with 
the general elections in May 1993, 
J. whereas the people will be deprived of the right to vote in the areas to 
which UNTAC does not have free access as a result of obstruction 'by the 
Khmer Rouge, 
K. whereas, over the last twenty years, many Cambodians have been forced by war 
and repression to leave their country and take up residence outside Khmer 
territory, and whereas these people have not, however, lost their 
nationality in a country where the tradition of jus sanguinis is very 
strong, 
L. whereas the Security Council has recommended that a presidential election 
should be held in addition to the general election in May 1993, 
M. whereas the Khmer Rouge derive substantial revenue from the cross-border 
trade in which they engage from the territories under their control, i.e. 
the export to Thailand of wood, precious stones and minerals, at a rate and 
in disgraceful conditions which are the cause of a genuine environmental 
disaster, 
N. concerned that human rights should be respected, especially once UNTAC has 
completed its mission in the country, and aware of the need for the 
achievements in this field to be protected, 
0. deploring the neglect and the pillaging suffered by the historic sites at 
Angkor, 
P. whereas the partial failure to implement the Paris Agreements is imposing 
fresh responsibilities on the international community and making it 
imperative that the UN should not withdraw from Cambodia until such time as 
a Khmer national security force has replaced the armed forces of the rival 
factions, 
1. Pays tribute to the UN Secretary-General's special representative and his 
support for UNTAC, a major UN operation in the world; 
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2. Pays homage to the moderating, stabilizing role played by Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk as President of the Cambodian Supreme National Council; 
3. Considers that a presidential election should be arranged in conjunction 
with the general elections, so as to ensure stability and security during 
the transitional period before and after the elections; 
4. Is concerned at the acts of violence that fractions which have agreed to 
take part in the general elections have committed against their rivals, 
particularly the operations carried out by groups claiming allegiance to the 
People's Party (the party supported by the Phnom Penh Government); 
5. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the attitude of the Khmer Rouge, 
who refuse to implement the Paris Agreements of October 1991 and, in 
particular, to lay down their arms and, consequently, to demobilize their 
troops and assign them to camps, and also the ceasefire violations, 
obstacles to the work of NGOs, attacks against UNTAC workers and the ban on 
UNTAC, denying it access to the areas under Khmer Rouge control, thus 
preventing the people in such areas from taking part in the elections; 
6. Regrets the fact that no administrative arrangements have been made by UNTAC 
and the Supreme National Council to enable Khmer people living outside 
Cambodia, and particularly in Europe, to register as voters and calls on 
UNTAC and the Supreme National Council to take the steps required to remedy 
this anomaly; 
7. Notes that the impossibility of implementing the prov1s1ons concerning 
disarmament, assignment to camps and demobilization means that peace and 
security will not be guaranteed in Cambodia at the time of the elections and 
that, as a result, the international community will retain a significant 
responsibility in this respect after the presidential and general elections; 
8. Calls on the United Nations to take all the technical, financial and human 
measures needed to enable UNTAC to enforce the provisions of the Paris 
Agreements providing for the disarmament, assignment to camps and 
demobilization of the rival forces; 
9. Calls on the United Nations not to abandon Cambodia to its fate following 
the elections in spring 1993 and, accordingly, to leave a security force in 
place until such time as the military threat from the Khmer Rouge has been 
eliminated, thereby enabling the new Cambodian democracy to take root; 
10. Welcomes, therefore, the interest shown by the UN Security Council in its 
resolution of 27 November 1992 in security in Cambodia following the 
elections, and recommends that a Khmer security apparatus be set up and 
taken in hand at the earliest opportunity by the UN Secretary-General's 
representative, this apparatus being designed to replace without delay the 
armed forces of the rival factions in order to guarantee the unity, 
territorial integrity and security of Cambodia; 
11. Calls on the United Nations immediately to start preparing a policy for 
economic development in Cambodia by making the best possible use of the 
considerable sums currently spent in Cambodia outside the country's economic 
and monetary systems and without benefit to the people, and by including the 
economic aid pledged at the Tokyo Conference in June 1992, together with 
other aid, both bi- and multilateral, and also the revenue from exports when 
DOC_EN\RR\223\223073 
- 6 - PE 203.359/fin. 
these are finally brought under control; recommends that this be dealt with 
at the economic conference referred to in Security Council Resolution 792; 
calls for this social and economic development aid to be administered in 
cooperation with the local population and the NGOs working in Cambodia, and 
stresses that it must not disrupt local markets and damage the environment; 
12. Notes with satisfaction the food aid, aid for refugees and emergency aid 
granted by the Community via non-governmental organizations, but urges that 
the Commission be represented in Phnom Penh - as frequently called for by 
Parliament - and that the Community be present at international meetings 
concerned with Cambodia's future - which is not currently the case; 
1 3. Welcomes UN Security Council Decision 792, which follows on from the 
recommendation of 22 September 1992 by the Cambodian Supreme National 
Council that a moratorium be imposed on the export of wood, and calls on the 
countries involved in such trade, particularly Thailand, to observe such a 
ban; 
14. Calls on the Cambodian Supreme National Council, and on the Security 
Council, to impose a similar moratorium on the export of minerals and 
precious stones and also calls on the countries involved, particularly 
Thailand, to observe such an embargo; 
15. Calls on UNTAC to ensure that these two decisions are respected through the 
establishment in Cambodia of checkpoints along the frontier with Thailand 
and, if necessary, to use force to do so; 
16. Decides to send a delegation of observers to the general elections to be 
held in May 1993; 
17. Calls on the UN Human Rights Commission to appoint a rapporteur on human 
rights in Cambodia, to enable achievements in this area to be safeguarded 
in their entirety following the departure of UNTAC, and to make the 
international community aware of the problem; 
18. Calls on the Community and the Member State governments to give particular 
attention to preservation of the historic sites at Angkor, which are already 
included on the list of cultural artefacts with special world value drawn 
up by UNESCO in connection with the Convention on World Heritage; 
19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
Commission, the UN Secretary-General, the President of the Cambodian Supreme 
National Council, the UN Secretary-General's special representative in Phnom 
Penh, and the Government of Thailand. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. REVIEW OF THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENTS ONE YEAR AFTER THEIR SIGNATURE 
More than a year after the Paris peace agreements were signed on 23 October 
1991, there are grave doubts with regard to the peace process as the date of May 
1993 draws nearer, when the election for a constituent assembly is to be held. 
In fact, after a very slow and laborious process to establish UNTAC over the 
whole of Cambodian territory, the country has not proceeded to the second phase 
of the peace process concerning the UNTAC mission's military objectives which 
should have started on 13 June 1992. This operation required the disarmament 
and assignment to camps of some 200 000 men from the four rival factions - the 
Phnom Penh Government, the Khmer Rouge, the FUNCINPEC army1 and the Liberal 
Party, as well as the demobilization and return to civilian life of 70% of 
former military personnel. 
Resolution No. 792, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 
27 November 1992, draws preliminary conclusions from this situation. 
The problems obstructing the whole peace process can be largely explained by the 
refusal of the Khmer Rouge to respect the Paris agreements. The Khmer Rouge 
have infringed several provisions of the agreements. In particular: 
1. They have violated the ceasefire several times, by invading territory 
previously occupied by other factions; they have fired on helicopters and other 
UNTAC property, intimidated the population and taken hostages; 
2. They have refused to disarm their troops which are thought to number some 
11 000 men and they have not returned to camps in the places designated, whereas 
55 000 soldiers from the other factions, of an estimated total of 200 000 men, 
have done so; 
3. They have refused access to the territory they control to UNTAC civil and 
military personnel, particularly in the Pailin area, where, with the help of 
private companies from Thailand, they are carrying on an extremely lucrative 
export trade in precious stones and wood; these operations are being carried out 
intensively, under conditions which harm the region's ecology; 
4. In general, they are not allowing the inhabitants of the areas they occupy 
to register on electoral lists. 
The Khmer Rouge justify their rejection of the peace process by denouncing the 
lack of impartiality shown by UNTAC with regard to the Phnom Penh Government: 
according to them, the process of drawing up electoral lists has enabled a large 
number (which they sometimes put at two million) of Vietnamese settlers to be 
legally registered, thus constituting a threat to Cambodian identity. 
Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique et 
Cooperatif (Unified National Front for an Independant, Neutral, Peaceful and 
Cooperative Cambodia) 
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The different factions in the conflict do not supply any evidence to support 
these allegations which are rejected by the UNTAC personnel in charge of drawing 
up the electoral lists. The accusations repented by Mr Son Sann, President of 
the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, that a large number of Vietnamese 
settlers and immigrants have infiltrated the country, are also rejected by UNTAC 
officials. It is true, however, that with regard to administrative control, 
UNTAC has been induced, or obliged by the enormity of the task and the relative 
lack of resources, to exercise caution in its interpretation of the Paris 
agreements and its mandate, which has led to the continued existence of de facto 
administrations of the different factions, primarily those of the 'state of 
Cambodia' which control most of the country. The Khmer Rouge claim that this 
situation justifies their obstructive attitude. 
On the other hand, the humanitarian objectives, principally the repatriation 
from Thailand of all the refugees and displaced persons, have achieved a very 
positive result. There are reasonable grounds for hope that all the refugees 
will have returned to Cambodia and that most will have been reintegrated by 31 
March 1993, which is the deadline set for the end of this operation. 
Of the 350 000 people who were still in refugee camps in Thailand, 250 000 had 
already been repatriated by the beginning of the year by the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, as part of an operation which in itself 
demonstrates confidence in the peace process. 
The visit to the refugee centre in Otaki, in Battambang province, and to the 
reception area in Cahmkar Samrong, close to the town of Battambang, gave a 
strong impression that excellent work was being carried on in this area. 
However, while the achievements of some mine clearance teams must be commended, 
it is evident that UNTAC's responsibilities are solely concerned with staff 
training and instruction; very slow progress is being made and this situation 
is likely to make the work of identifying land to be allocated to returning 
refugees still more difficult. 
In pursuance of the political objectives of the Paris agreements, UNTAC has been 
given the following tasks: 
establishing a climate of neutrality to allow free and transparent elections 
to the legislature to be organized; 
organizing these elections; 
ensuring respect for human rights; 
establishing a suitable information policy to enable these aims to be 
achieved; 
maintaining order throughout the whole procedure. 
Undoubtedly there has been enormous progress in establishing a multi-party 
system in Cambodia ( 18 political parties have already registered for the 
elections) and at present all the parties can carry on their activities and have 
unrestricted access to the population. 
There are too many instances of intimidation, harassment, threats or attacks on 
party headquarters, but these are fairly limited in comparison to what might 
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have been feared, in view of the country's recent past. There has, however, 
been a clear resurgence of incidents of this kind during recent months. It is 
generally thought that elements close to the party in power are responsible for 
the increase in violent incidents and attacks, sometimes leading to loss of 
life, and it is difficult to put any other interpretation on them than that of 
a fairly systematic attempt to intimidate the population in order to remind 
people that the UN presence and the electoral process make little difference to 
the real exercise of power. Access to the information media and to the people 
in general is another problem to which we shall return. 
The process of drawing up electoral registers started on 5 October 1992. By 3 
December, two million people had registered, out of an estimated total of 4.5 
million voters2 • Four thousand Cambodians are working as electoral agents and 
the political parties are delegating representatives as scrutineers to ensure 
that foreigners are not registered. 
Special attention must be paid to the electoral law promulgated by the United 
Nations' Secretariat Special Representative by virtue of the powers given him 
by the Paris agreement and to electoral registration in various centres in the 
interior of the country. 
There is every indication that the arrangements made to ensure strict monitoring 
of the nationality of voters, in particular the public nature of registration 
procedures, which take place under the supervision of representatives of the 
various political parties, are a reasonable insurance against infiltration by 
Vietnamese or other foreigners. It should be noted, moreover, that there is a 
very small, even infinitesimal, number of objections to decisions on 
registration. However, some situations require particular attention from UNTAC; 
such as, for example, that of the Khmers whose families have lived in South 
Vietnam for several generations and who were therefore born there, which 
excludes them from Cambodian citizenship and thus from the elections. The 
introduction, no doubt inevitable, of an electoral law based on the principle 
of the country of birth will certainly come into conflict with the traditions 
of a people who have always respected the law of parentage. 
A worse situation is faced by hundreds of thousands of Cambodians who were 
obliged by war, insecurity or terrorism to settle outside their country but who 
must register in Cambodia itself if they wish to be included on the electoral 
lists. The special representative of the UN Secretary-General does not contest 
the right of these people to vote, but maintains that there are practical 
difficulties which prevent the opening, under the supervision of the UN and 
representatives of the political parties, of registration offices outside 
Cambodia and particularly in Paris. This situation infringes the principle of 
equal electoral rights for all Cambodians and politically ostracizes those who 
have done no wrong other than being forced into exile during the last 20 years. 
Finally, the case of the inhabitants of the areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge 
who have not been able to register as voters because the Khmer Rouge refused to 
allow access to these areas to UNTAC personnel, is a real problem. In 
principle, this situation affects approximately 15% to 20% of the territory, and 
5% to 10% of the population. If it persists, Resolution 792 states that general 
2 Three million are now registered. 
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elections will not be held in thes~ areas, nor for this section of the 
population. 
With regard to respect for human rights, UNTAC has set itself a short-term 
objective: to ensure a minimum level of respect for human rights so that free 
and transparent elections can be organized within the planned time-scale. This 
minimum level has in general not been achieved; this gives rise to considerable 
concern. Intimidation and fear are widespread in several provinces, there have 
been grenade attacks against the offices of political parties, and civilians 
have been killed by the Khmer Rouge. There is a complete lack of law and order 
on roads and tracks and sometimes in villages. It is also alleged that people 
have been imprisoned without trial; the existence of a new penal code does not 
constitute a safeguard if it is ignored. 
UNTAC's human rights service does what it can, with the reduced means at its 
disposal (ten full-time people and one person in each province); there is an 
enormous amount of work to be done. 
Five Cambodian non-governmental organizations are working in this sector and 
they have a particularly difficult task, in view of the problems and resistance 
they encounter. The work they do is acceptable; they should continue to receive 
funding from the European Commission but a long-term objective should also be 
set, such as setting up an institutional structure which would continue after 
UNTAC has departed. 
Supervision of existing administrative structures carried out by UNTAC's civil 
administration services with the aim of establishing a neutral political climate 
has been put into effect in some sectors in the capital: external relations, 
defence, finance, public safety and information. Success is relative and the 
administrations will be neutral only to a very limited extent on election day. 
In general, the administration is controlled by the State of Cambodia, except 
for the areas occupied by the Khmer Rouge, to which UNTAC does not have access. 
157 people are involved in this area of UNTAC's work, but many of the~ do not 
have the necessary professional qualifications. Officials agree that corruption 
is a very serious problem. 
It must be pointed out again that the massive registration of voters_for the 
forthcoming election is a success in itself. However, it is evident that the 
Phnom Penh regime controls most of the information media, and it is difficult 
to provide information to the population about UNTAC programmes, particularly 
in the interior of the country. 
It is clear that the UNTAC civilian police service, 'CIVPOL', is unable to 
guarantee securi tv. CIVPOL is not armed, whereas a large part of the population 
is; this shows the options available to this branch of UNTAL for taking 
effective action. Taking account of the current situation, UNTAC, with minimal 
resources, must be able to carry out its obligations to act as a dissuasive 
force and guarantee security. Unless it can do this, the credibility of UNTAC's 
civilian police will continue to be practically non-existent. 
Finally, with regard to the rehabilitation programmes, much ground, in fact 
nearly all the ground, is still to be covered. The aid promised at the Tokyo 
Conference arrives in dribs and drabs and is highly unsatisfactory. So far, 
only 75 of the 880 million dollars envisag;ed by the Conference have been 
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granted. There is also some confusion as to the actual amount granted by the 
Conference; it could be less than the figure originally published. 
The State of Cambodia itself is obviously incapable of meeting the country's 
need for reconstruction and the budget deficit represents 50% of public 
expenditure. The country's reconstruction has hardly started, still less its 
development. 
Public services are disintegrating, and it is only in the sectors where non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are taking specific action that work is 
starting up again. At present, only the donor countries and not UNTAC, are 
financing various rehabilitation projects, mainly in the field of primary public 
health. 
As to investments, they are rather unusual. Most of the investment is made by 
Thais outside the Cambodian economy, in services such as hotels, restaurants, 
brothels, etc. and in trade with foreigners, where payments are made in foreign 
currency, with no profit for the country's economy. 
However, despite all that has been said, in the capital and the towns there is 
an impression of peace (in the daytime at any rate). There are no guards on 
Phnom Penh airport, the embassies or public places, the markets are better 
stocked than before, pagodas, houses and shacks have been repaired. Cambodians 
want to believe in peace. This provides grounds for hope. 
The other reason for this apparent calm is less reassuring. The Khmer Rouge 
have an interest in convincing the international community that there is total 
security, in the hope that the foreigners will go away immediately after the 
election. What other explanation is there for the fact that the capacity of the 
Khmer Rouge to make their presence felt, even to carry out acts of terrorism, 
in the capital and the major cities, is not being expressed in spectacular 
attacks and other fireworks? 
II. POLITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
The entire process begun over a year ago with the October 1991 Paris Agreements 
is seriously at risk mainly from the attitude of the Khmer Rouge who do not 
respect the obligations imposed by the agreements although they signed them. 
The European Parliament delegation which visited Cambodia tried in vain to meet 
the faction's senior officials; it even proposed a visit to the Khmer Rouge in 
their headquarters in Pailin, where there is now an UNTAC office. Both requests 
were refused; the visit to Pailin would have entailed flying briefly over a zone 
controlled by the Khmer Rouge, and UNTAC thought it necessary to ask for prior 
authorization from the Khmer Rouge. This confirms that the Khmer Rouge are not 
willing to enter into any dialogue, further confirmation is provided by the 
failure of the Peking Conference of 8 November 1992. The recent absence of 
Khmer Rouge representatives from the Supreme National Council of Cambodia is 
also worrying. 
Faced with this attitude, UNTAC is in a difficult and entirely unacceptable 
situation. The orders given to its military wing do not allow it act except as 
an observer of the peace, but there is no peace. Current circumstances call for 
a revision of these orders to enable UNTAC to impose its authority and establish 
a state of peace in conjunction with international guarantees. 
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The responsibility of the Khmer Rouge in this situation is therefore evident. 
But UNTAC has not been instructed to evaluate, with the shrewdness and long-term 
perspective which would be needed, the complex situation in the country. Its 
indecisiveness at key moments, the fragility of some of its elements and the 
restrictive interpretation of its instructions have not made its task any 
easier. 
The report must also clearly point out the responsibility of neighbouring 
countries, which approved the peace process and should therefore be playing an 
active part in collaboration with the United Nations. This remark is 
particularly aimed at Thailand whose attitude is ambivalent to say the least, 
putting commercial interests before the attainment of peace. 
With regard to the political parties, FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia), which is a grouping 
of the supporters of Prince Ranariddh, one of the sons of Prince Sihanouk, and 
the FNLPK (Khmer People's National Liberation Front) led by Mr Son Sann, have 
extended their influence over the whole country and have made a definite 
impression on the people. The People's Party, which is the political arm of the 
state of Cambodia, is experiencing some difficulties in taking effective action 
against the rise of this opposition. 
Among the country's two traditional parties, Prince Ranariddh is popular in the 
provinces, with a certain section of the population (peasants, small tradesmen 
and those who are nostalgic for the past), while the more active KPNLF is more 
popular with town dwellers and educated people (intellectuals, doctors, 
teachers), and with the leading militants in the struggle against the Vietnamese 
in the early 1980s. 
The People's Party however remains the most powerful in Cambodia. The membership 
system which has been in place for ten years, the large number of people who 
benefit from Party membership, the network of alliances built up with new 
parties such as the PLD of General Sak Sutsakhan, the 'backup' it has in the 
administration, all go to ensure that it is still an impressive political force, 
even if its image is tarnished by the wave of corruption and by local abuses of 
power. 
Popular support for the Khmer Rouge is difficult to assess, but probably still 
exists. Could they have an interest in the elections, even without taking part, 
as their non-participation would give an advantage to their former political 
allies? This question needs to be considered. 
The most recent United Nations' Security Council Resolution (No. 792 of 
27 November 1992) envisages a presidential election 'in conjunction' with the 
general election. It would be advantageous and reasonable to organize this 
presidential election before the elections to the legislature. It would greatly 
help to maintain stability and security during the transitional period and after 
the elections to the legislature. The powers of the president would have to be 
confirmed by the constituent assembly. 
III. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PRESENCE AND ASSISTANCE 
Since the Paris Agreements were signed in October 1991, the European Community 
has granted aid of approximately ECU 43 billion to Cambodia. Previously, up to 
November 1991, without taking account of the large amount of aid offered when 
the Khmer Rouge departed in 1980, the European Community granted a total of ECU 
DOC_EN\RR\223\223073 - 13 - PE 203.359/fin. 
78 million in aid to Cambodia, mainly as food aid and as co-financing of 58 
small projects by non-governmental organizations. 
The amount granted since the peace agreements is made up of ECU 1.8 million food 
aid for refugees and displaced persons, 2. 4 million for the repatriation 
programme of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1.5 million 
via the Red Cross for victims of the drought in the north east provinces and 0.4 
million via the Mekong Committee for aerial photography and map-making projects. 
Despite previous recommendations by Parliament, the first official European 
Community mission to Cambodia did not take place until April 1992, at which time 
ECU 8 million were granted to finance development projects, in the context of 
a rehabilitation programme in the areas of Battambang and Pursat. In addition, 
ECU 7.6 million were sent via non-governmental organizations, mainly for health 
and education purposes. 
The work carried out by the European Community through the NGOs working in 
difficult conditions is impressive. Priority is given to work on the ground in 
the health, education and hygiene sectors. The projects in which Buddhist monks 
are involved as natural leaders of their local communities are a praiseworthy 
achievement; these projects promote the civil and social education which are 
essential for Cambodia's social and moral reconstruction. 
Although the work being done is of good quality, the smallness of its scale is 
regrettable. More regrettable still is the lack of a European Commission 
presence in Phnom Penh, and consequently its absence from the discussions on the 
country's economic future. Europe is represented only by bilateral aid from the 
Member States acting individually. If their aid was counted in the total amount 
of aid granted by the European Community, it would amount to ECU 195 million, 
and the Community would have a place in the important discussions. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The peace process in Cambodia is at a standstill, after the refusal of the Khmer 
Rouge to begin phase II of the peace agreements. The operation must therefore 
be modified, in view of the fact that it is the largest which the United Nations 
have ever undertaken, and also that its failure would be disastrous for the 
country and for the stability of the whole of South-East Asia and possibly 
beyond. Security Council Resolution No. 792 commits the international community 
to this course of action. 
Congratulations, then, on the achievements of the United Nations forces. Within 
the framework of the Paris Agreements and the discussions which followed, UNTAC 
has made remarkable progress in preparing for the general elections to be held 
at the end of next Spring; it has made a contribution to the security of the 
operation to bring 350 000 refugees and displaced persons back and begin to 
reintegrate them into society; it has reestablished an atmosphere of confidence 
in a large part of Cambodia. 
Disarmament being impossible, the planned process of assigning to camps and 
demobilization is blocked. The climate of peaceful neutrality can therefore not 
be guaranteed. The elections will take place in a country which is armed. It 
is unfortunately unlikely that elections can be held in the zones to which UNTAC 
has no access and is not authorized to obtain access by force. 
The damaging exploitation of the regions bordering Thailand is being carried on 
outside the Cambodia economy and in scandalous conditions, particularly from the 
ecological point of view. 
What this means is that there are no guarantees for Cambodia's future, the day 
after the elections in May 1993. The reasons which led the international 
community to intervene, through UNTAC, to reestablish security - although its 
forces only have the means to maintain order in the areas where they are allowed 
access - and to enable reconstruction and development to take place in Cambodia, 
these same reasons will remain after the elections. They should induce the 
international community to continue its activities in the country, clearly in 
different forms from those currently applying. 
To this end, the Member States of the European Community should fully support 
United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 792 of 27 November 1992; the 
United Nations' initiative to call a meeting in the near future of all the 
countries and all the international organizations providing economic assistance 
to Cambodia, in order to review the current situation with regard to economic 
cooperation with that country, is to be welcomed as an extension of the 
Conference for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cambodia held in Tokyo 
in June 1992. 
Moreover, the Security Council must declare a moratorium on the export of 
precious stones and minerals, similar to the one envisaged by Resolution No. 792 
for the export of wood, in order to protect the country's natural resources; 
these exports are responsible for an ecological disaster which is already 
visible in the part of Sangker which leads from the mountainous region of Pailin 
towards the town of Battambang. In this respect the cooperation of neighbouring 
countries, particularly Thailand, is essential. We gained the impression, from 
what was said by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, that this would be 
possible. To ensure the effectiveness of the embargo, the checkpoints mentioned 
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in Resolution No. 792 would have to be set up. This could be done on Cambodian 
territory without going into Thailand. Again UNTAC needs to be instructed to 
cross areas to which at present it does not have access, which could involve the 
use of force. 
A proposal should be made that the United Nations' Committee on Human Rights 
appoint a rapporteur on the human rights situation in Cambodia as soon as 
possible. Such a decision would enable what has been achieved in the human 
rights area to be maintained after UNTAC' s departure and would give the 
international community a greater awareness of the problem. Finally, it would 
be desirable to send a European Parliament delegation of observers to the 
elections in May 1993, in response to the request by the representative of the 
United Nations' Secretary-General in Cambodia, Mr Akashi. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
OPINION 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
Letter from the chairman to Mr BARON CRESPO, chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security 
Brussels, 15 July 1992 
Subject: Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the 
political situation in Cambodia 
Dear Mr Baron Crespo, 
At its meetings of 23 June 1992 and 14 July 1992 the Committee on Development 
and Cooperation considered the above subject and at its meeting of 15 July 1992 
it adopted the following opinion in the form of a letter. 
At the end of 1990, the Committee on Development and Cooperation delivered an 
opinion on the situation in South-East Asia1 , in which it made specific 
reference to the situation in Cambodia. 
The committee believes that the situation of this country of approximately 
8.5 million inhabitants is particularly difficult. The scale of its needs and 
problems has been particularly we!l hignlighted in a study carried out in situ 
at the request of a group of NGOs . 
One of the most serious problems facing the country in the short term is 
evidently that of refugees and displaced persons. Currently, some 360 000 
Cambodians who fled to Thailand are to be repatriated within the framework of 
the UN plan to bring peace to the country and organize elections, scheduled for 
April 1993. If all the refugees, displaced persons and soldiers to be 
reintegrated into civilian life are taken together, the number of individuals 
to be dealt with in the short term is approximately 700 000. 
Throughout the 1980s, the European Community supplied aid both to Cambodia and 
to Cambodian refugees, mainly those in Thailand. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation believes that the process which has 
been put in hand under the aegis of the United Nations with a view to allowing 
elections to be held in 1993, as stated above, is of major importance for the 
future of Cambodia and hence for South-east Asia as a whole. 
PE 143.257/fin., 26 November 1990 1 
2 NGO Forum on Cambodia, Development Planning in the state of Cambodia, 1989 
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Or. Fr. 
The Council referred to this issue at its meeting of 4 November 1991, when it 
agreed that the Community should implement closer cooperation with Cambodia to 
underpin the Peace Plan, using the various Community instruments available 
(including support for NGOs, aid for the repatriation of refugees, the GSP, and 
cooperation with the developing countries of Asia and Latin America), with a 
view to a future cooperation agreement. The Council also noted that the 
Commission had begun examining possible measures and would be submitting 
appropriate proposals to the Council at the earliest opportunity3. The 
Committee on Development and Cooperation can only welcome and support this 
decision. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation notes with satisfaction that since 
the signing o ~ the Paris Peace Agreement in October 1991 , Community aid has been 
considerably stepped up; according to recent data provided by the Commission4 , 
ECU 9.95 million were committed for the period from October to December 1991, 
ECU 18.55 million between January and May 1992, with a further ECU 5.4 million 
having just been committed in June 1992. In total, ECU 33.9 have been committed 
since October 1992, ECU 24 million of which during the first part of 1992. ECU 
16.7 million have been granted in the form of food aid, ECU 8 million have been 
devoted to an urgent rehabilitation programme to rural areas, and ECU 5 million 
have just been committed as a contribution to the UNHCR repatriation plan. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation welcomes the holding of the 
Ministerial Conference on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia, in 
Tokyo on 22 June. The committee welcomes the success of this conference which 
brought together almost $ 880 millior1 to the end of 1993 from the countries and 
international organizations which took ~art; the Community announced, via the 
Commission representative in attendance , that its financial contribution will 
be at least as great in 1993, and probably even larger. 
This effort on the part of the Community fully accords with the wishes of the 
Committee on Development and Cooperation. 
The committee particularly welcomes the fact that the Political Declaration on 
the peace process adopted at the Tokyo Conference calls on all parties in 
Cambodia to adhere to the provisions of the Paris Agreement. In his speech, the 
Commission representative also recalled th.at the Commission and the Member 
States had stressed that it was essential for all parties in Cambodia to work 
in a spirit of cooperation and in total adherence to the Paris Agreement. 
The Committee on Development emphasizes as strongly as possible that, both for 
itself and for the European Parliament, this is an absolute sine qua non. The 
essential work of rehabilitation in which the Community must play a full part 
cannot be carried out unless all parties adhere to the Paris Agreement. In 
refusing since 13 June to participate in the disarmament process, the Khmer 





Press release, General Affairs Council, 4 November 1991 
Community assistance programme for Cambodia, 24.6.1992 
Speech by Mr J. Prat, Tokyo, 22.6.1992 
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The Committee on Development and Cooperation believes that as of today it is 
necessary to make it absolutely clear that the Community cannot continue· its 
efforts unless all parties in Cambodia adhere forthwith to the provisions of 
the Paris Agreement. 
In conclusion, the Committee on Development and Cooperation: 
1. Welcomes the active implementation of the Peace Plan under the aegis of 
the United Nations to bring peace to the country and hold free, democratic 
elections scheduled for the first half of 1993; 
2. Stresses that the European Community must do everything in its power to 
assist the success of this Peace Plan, and that an increased Community 
development aid effort could play a crucial role in this respect; 
3. Believes that the time has now come for Cambodia to be taken fully into 
account in the framework of the European Community's development 
cooperation policy; welcomes, in this connection, the Council's decision 
to implement closer cooperation with Cambodia, using the various Community 
instruments available with a view to a future cooperation agreement; 
4. Approves the assistance programme implemented by the Commission since 
October 1991 which has so far led to ECU 34 million being committed; 
5. Welcomes the success of the Tokyo Ministerial Conference on the 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia; approves, particularly, the 
statements of the Commission representative with regard to the level of 
Community aid for 1993; 
6. Expresses its great concern that one of the parties in Cambodia - the 
Khmer Rouge - should be jeopardizing the Paris Agreement by its refusal 
since mid-June to take part in the disarmament process now under way; 
7. Stresses that there is absolutely no question of continuing with the 
Community's essential aid effort, with the exception of emergency and 
humanitarian aid channelled through NGOs, if the Paris Agreement is not 
respected forthwith and in its entirety by all parties in Cambodia. 
Yours sincerely, 
(sgd) Henri SABY 
The following took part in the vote: Saby, chairman, Belo, vice-chairman, Breyer 
(for Melandri), Christiansen (for Bird), Mendes Bota, Miranda da Silva (for 
Wurtz), Pons Grau, Sandbaek (for Ewing), Telkamper, Van Hemeldonck, Verhagen and 
Wynn. 
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